From 1983 onwards, we resolved that our party would concentrate its entire resources, such as they were, on a programme of long-term organisational development with a view eventually to acquiring the means necessary to make its voice heard properly by the nation, rather than continually butt its head against the brick wall of the electoral system in circumstances in which, as at that time, it had no hope of making any significant dent.
This would not mean that electoral activity would be abandoned in its entirety; occasions could arise in which the investment of money and effort in election campaigns would pay off in terms of those campaigns providing us with a platform by which to make our name known and get our message across; but the choice of when and where to do this would have to be made very selectively, with a view to such forays absorbing only a small portion of our overall resources and energies. This strategy had become particularly necessary in view of the increase in parliamentary election deposits to £500.
For this reason and for others, it was decided that the party would not take part in the general election of 1987, although by that time it was stronger, and its resources greater, than in 1983. The decision, though it caused some controversy at the time, was vindicated: in the aftermath of the election the party remained in a healthy condition financially, and was thus able to go ahead with the next stage of its organisational development. Had it taken part in the 1987 election, the effort would have left it financially exhausted and almost certainly with few votes to its name in a political climate that had not changed fundamentally since four years earlier.
I am in no doubt that, ultimately, the ballot box is the only possible path open to British Nationalism to win political power. Those who talk of other means being employed are just emitting so much hot air which betrays a woeful incomprehension of political conditions existing in Britain. I have analysed in a previous chapter the possibilities of achieving political success for our movement by working within one of the established political parties – possibilities amounting to zero, as I have made clear. There is of course the idiot fringe which talks (usually under ample lubrication) of other political methods, which stripped of all the verbiage boil down to the use of armed force – in modern Britain a fantasy so ludicrous it invites the intervention of the men in white coats.
An open nationalist challenge at the polls therefore remains the one possible avenue by which we may succeed; but, while accepting this, we must ensure that we join battle on ground of our own choosing, where conditions are favourable.
Tyndall J, 1998, The Eleventh Hour: A call for British rebirth, Third Edition, London: Albion Press, pp 491-92